Exploring the demands of assimilation among white ethnic majorities in Western Europe by Marco Antonsich (1251417)
 
 
 
This item was submitted to Loughborough’s Institutional Repository 
(https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/) by the author and is made available under the 
following Creative Commons Licence conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the full text of this licence, please go to: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
 
 1 
Exploring the demand of assimilation among white ethnic     
majorities in Western Europe 
 
Abstract 
Since the mid-1990s, assimilation has gradually regained momentum as both a norma-
tive and an analytical concept to understand the ways in which migrants are incorpo-
rated into societies at large. Although scholars have investigated various dimensions 
of this process, they have tended to privilege the experience of migrants themselves. 
Comparatively little attention has been dedicated to the perspective of the dominant 
groups, particularly in relation to what ethnic majority people demand migrants to do 
in relation to accept them. The present article explores this demand of assimilation by 
relying on qualitative data collected among white local elites in four regional case 
studies in Western Europe. The analysis reveals a different picture from the one usual-
ly portrayed by the ‘new assimilation theory’. Accordingly, the article suggests re-
thinking assimilation in ways which incorporate more fully the plurality of demands 
put forward by dominant ethnic groups. 
 
Keywords: assimilation, integration, multiculturalism, Western Europe 
 
1.Introduction 
During a conference on multiculturalism and integration held in Britain in 2005, Gril-
lo (2007: 982) recalls that a person from the audience, anonymously identified as Mr 
S, asked to a distinguished panel of academics and politicians what he should do as a 
Muslim to show that he had integrated: 
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I would like to know how I can prove that I’m a Muslim and I have integrated 
into society. Look at me. I wear British clothes. I speak broken English but, still, 
I speak English and I have got a beard. That gives away my identity. Some peo-
ple would recognise who I am. Now, people ask me “Why don’t you integrate?” 
and I say, “How do you mean?” And they can’t answer me back because I go to 
schools, give talks about how to deal with racist incidents and very often the 
teachers ask me, ‘Why don’t Muslims integrate?’ I say, “What do you mean? I 
pay tax. I obey the law of the land” 
 
This episode is not only telling of the contentious character of any integration 
process. It also reveals the demand of assimilation posed by the larger society to those 
members whose ethno-cultural and religious diversity appears ‘too visible’, ‘too di-
verse’. 
Across the Western world and, particularly, in Europe, the increasing uneasiness 
with this type of diversity is a phenomenon largely echoed by the mass-media and 
widely investigated in academic works. Some international and domestic events seem 
to have contributed to this present climate hostile to those who appear not ‘to fit in’: 
Islamist attacks against Western cities and the ensuing ‘war on terror’; inter-racial un-
rests in the towns of Northern England (2001) and in the French banlieues (2005 and 
2007); and, more recently, a severe economic downturn, which has triggered resent-
ment against immigrants, accused of being the source of either the economic decline 
(‘scapegoats’) or unfair labour competition (‘scabs’) (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 
2009: 404). Popular reactions across Western Europe in particular have demanded to 
curtail the flows of undocumented migrants and refugees, to expel ‘undesired’ ethnic 
communities (e.g., Roma in Italy and Northern Ireland), to remove from the public 
eye symbols of religious diversities (e.g., minarets in Switzerland and ‘burka’ in 
France, Belgium, and Italy), and to oblige the newcomers to plea allegiance to their 
new country.  
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Fear and anxiety towards ethno-cultural and religious diversity have generated a 
new demand of assimilation, which has reversed the trend towards pluralism and mul-
ticulturalism of 1970s-1980s (Brubaker 2001; Joppke 2004). The shift from multicul-
turalism to assimilation has been a generalised tendency in many Western countries, 
also in those which had previously espoused forms of multiculturalism: the Nether-
lands (Entzinger 2003), Sweden (Joppke and Morawska 2003a), Germany (Brubaker 
2001), Britain (Pilkington 2008), Australia (Vasta 2007), and the USA (Mitchell 
2003). The return of assimilation has been apparent in public discourses, governmen-
tal policies, and academic debates. Survey data indeed suggest that hostility towards 
migrants, support for tougher immigration policies, and desire for cultural unity and 
homogeneity are both substantial and growing (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2009; 
Citrin and Sides 2008). Citizenship tests, pledges of allegiance, stricter naturalization 
laws, mandatory language and civic classes, restrictions on refugees and migration 
flows, and reinforced controls of undocumented migrants are now in place, to various 
degrees, in most Western countries. Scholars have also rediscovered, both in analytic 
and normative terms, the importance of the notion of assimilation (Brubaker 2001; 
International Migration Review 1997; Joppke and Morawska 2003b). 
But what does it mean to assimilate? What does mainstream society demand Mr 
S and other fellow members who look or sound ‘different’ to do in order to accept 
them? Studies which analyse assimilation from the perspective of the dominant ethnic 
group are relatively scarce. These studies usually focus on the socio-demographic and 
contextual factors which explain positive/negative attitudes towards migrants (Pantoja 
2006; Haubert and Fussell 2006; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Leong 2008). Yet, 
within this perspective, assimilation is generally taken for granted. No attempts are 
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made to explore the specific demands of assimilation put forward by the dominant 
group.  
This article aims to discuss the notion of assimilation in relation to the plurality 
of demands posed by mainstream society to their ethno-culturally and religiously ‘di-
verse’ members. My discussion is articulated into two major parts. In the first part, I 
introduce the theoretical framework within which my argument is located. I trace the 
theoretical development of the notion of assimilation and I compare it to other similar 
notions (integration and acculturation) and to the notion which is usually portrayed as 
its opposite, multiculturalism. In the second part, I present and analyse empirical evi-
dence coming from individual interviews with local elites in four regional case studies 
in Western Europe. This qualitative information is used to explore the assimilationist 
demand originating from white dominant ethnic groups and to serve as a basis to criti-
cally engage, in the final section, the academic revival of the notion of assimilation. 
 
 
2.From assimilation to multiculturalism and back 
Assimilation is a highly contentious term, which lacks a commonly shared definition 
(Kivisto 2005: 4). Both in public discourses and in academic works, the term is often 
used interchangeably with another vaguely defined and contested term, ‘integration’ 
(Bowskill et al. 2007). For some, this latter term also incorporates the notion of as-
similation, along with other related terms: acculturation, accommodation, absorption, 
incorporation, inclusion, and participation (Castels et al. 2002: 126, 139; Favell 2001: 
352). From this perspective, assimilation would be just one possible way in which 
migrants integrate into mainstream society. Yet, this interpretation, which originates 
from sociological studies, is not commonly accepted across social sciences. Psycholo-
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gists, for instance, treat acculturation as the all-encompassing term (Berry 2008). As a 
result, it is not uncommon to find assimilation, integration, and acculturation used as 
synonyms in the literature. 
My goal here is not to draw conceptual lines between notions which often over-
lap. Some attempts in this sense have already been carried out (Castels et al. 2002), 
without dissipating completely the conceptual overlapping. This section, instead, aims 
to engage the notion of assimilation in historical perspective, in order to understand 
both its normative and analytical dimension and its demise and revival in relation to 
what is usually perceived as its opposite paradigm, i.e., multiculturalism. This would 
help contextualise the empirical data discussed in the next section. 
As it well known, from the late 19th century until the 1960s assimilation was the 
prevailing approach adopted by countries of immigration towards newcomers (Castels 
et al. 2002; Joppke and Morawska 2003a). The general expectation was that they had 
to assimilate into the new culture and abandon their own traditions and social habits 
(Vasta 2007). Among others, Robert Park (1914) and Milton Gordon (1964) contrib-
uted to delineate a general theory of assimilation, tailored on the case of the United 
States. In both accounts, assimilation involved the acquisition of the dominant group’s 
language, attitudes, life styles, modes of behaviour, values and, in Park, also religion 
(Alba and Nee 1997: 829; Kivisto 2005: 8-9). Cultural assimilation (defined as ‘accul-
turation’ by Gordon) was thought to be a spontaneous and inevitable process happen-
ing to individuals or groups by their entering in contact with a different culture. Yet, 
both Park and Gordon did not believe that this would per se mean the erasure of all 
signs of ethnic origin. To assimilate was, for Park, a way to enlarge one’s social hori-
zons, as new cultural forms would add to and ‘modernise’ previous ones (Kivisto 
2005: 8; Nagel 2009: 401). Similarly, Gordon believed that assimilation was a multi-
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stage process and the disappearance of any form of ethnic identity (what he called 
‘identificational assimilation’) was not something inevitable. This could happen only 
as part of what he called ‘structural assimilation’, defined as the ‘entrance of the mi-
nority group into the social cliques, clubs, and institutions of the core society at the 
primary group level’ (Gordon 1964: 80). Far from being a spontaneous and inevitable 
process, structural assimilation entailed volition on both immigrants and mainstream 
society (Kivisto 2005: 14). 
After World War II, assimilation fell gradually into disgrace (for a valuable dis-
cussion on the major factors which contributed to its demise see Joppke and Moraw-
ska 2003a). Starting in the late-1960s, new pluralist theories emerged, aimed at ex-
plaining the persistence of ethnic differences and new demands of recognition from 
marginalised social groups (e.g., blacks, women, and gays), indigenous peoples, and 
regionalist movements (Brubaker 2001; Kivisto 2005). These theories challenged the 
idea of a fixed and homogenous ‘core culture’ (coinciding with white middle-class 
culture) into which newcomers simply had to assimilate (Nagel 2009). Within this 
perspective, assimilation was regarded as a sort of ‘dirty word’ (Bauböck 1996b: 9), 
associated with coercive, ethnocentric, and patronising measures, often imposed by 
the state (Alba and Nee 1997:  827). Multiculturalism, on the contrary, emerged as the 
new prevailing paradigm, which, from the mid-1970s until the late-1990s, informed 
migration and racial policies of various Western countries, as well as the academic 
debate (Brubaker 2001; Joppke and Morawska 2003a). Within this paradigm, cultural 
diversity, rather than being something to be erased, was acknowledged and protected 
through state-funded initiatives (e.g. religious schools, education programs in foreign 
languages, ethnic mass-media, etc.). 
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Towards the end of the 1990s, however, official multiculturalism came increas-
ingly under attack, indirectly paving the way for an assimilationist revival (Brubaker 
2001), which, in scholarly terms, has become known as ‘new assimilation theory’ 
(Alba and Nee 1997). This theory maintains that assimilation is still a powerful ana-
lytical tool for understanding the process of migrants’ incorporation into contempo-
rary societies. Thus, the old assimilationist theory should not be rejected, but amend-
ed. Accordingly, by drawing on Park’s and Gordon’s earlier insights, its proponents 
stress the reciprocal character of the assimilation process (Barkan 1995; DeWind and 
Kasinitz 1997), since both migrants and the receiving society are expected to undergo 
some form of change. Moreover, the new theory looks at migrants as active subjects 
in the process of ‘becoming similar’ – what Brubaker (2001: 534) calls the ‘intransi-
tive’ meaning of assimilation, which he contrasts with the old ‘transitive’ meaning of 
‘making [someone] similar’ through forced policies and programmes. Likewise, the 
new assimilation theory does not necessarily anticipate the erasure of migrants’ cul-
ture of origin, since sameness (assimilation) and difference (multiculturalism and/or 
transnationalism) can actually coexist rather than being two dichotomous dimensions 
(Gans 1997: 877; Joppke and Morawska 2003a: 20; Kivisto 2005: 18, 24). 
The ‘new assimilation theory’ has certainly contributed to advance the under-
standing of the process of incorporation of migrants into the receiving countries, by 
showing, among other things, how this process is not necessarily without ‘bumps’ 
(Gans 1992). It indeed entails various stages, since it takes place in different domains 
and times, involving multiple generations (Brubaker 2001: 544; Alba and Nee 1997: 
827). Thus, it is also possible - as suggested by the ‘segmented assimilation model’ 
(Portes and Zhou 1993) - that second generation migrants become assimilated not into 
mainstream society’s middle-class (upward mobility), but into its socio-economically 
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deprived underclass (downward mobility) – an argument which still underlines the 
importance of the assimilationist drive in contemporary societies. 
I would argue, however, that the new assimilation theory, like its classic version, 
tends to privilege one of the two sides involved in the assimilation process. The dom-
inant group into whose social and cultural institutions migrants are supposed to assim-
ilate is often overlooked. What this group exactly demands to migrants and what, 
therefore, assimilation means to them is often left unaddressed in the literature. 
As a way to contribute to an understanding of the notion of assimilation from 
the ‘other’ side of this two-way process, the next section will examine public views of 
white ethnic majority individuals collected in four regional case studies in Western 
Europe. As discussed above, there is no lack of studies on the socio-demographic fac-
tors (e.g., age, education, political preference, etc.) which determine positive or nega-
tive attitudes towards migrants. Similarly, assimilationist scholars have clearly out-
lined the socio-economic dimensions (e.g., income, education, housing, etc.) where 
convergence between migrants and ethnic majority is used to assess the degree of as-
similation. Relatively little, instead, is known on the meanings that assimilation as-
sumes among ethnic majority people. I would argue that such a study is central to fur-
ther advance our understanding of the assimilation process, as it complements the 
view based on migrants’ perspectives. 
 
 
3.The case study 
The present study is part of a larger research on the changing relationship between 
territory and identity in the age of globalisation, based on both quantitative (Standard 
Eurobarometer surveys) and qualitative (individual interviews and focus groups) data 
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collected in Western Europe. For the purpose of the present article, only individual 
interviews with local elites (here defined as any person with a political, institutional or 
social role within the local society) will be used. During May 2005 and January 2006, 
I personally administered ninety-nine semi-structured individual interviews in four 
regions: Lombardia (Italy), Pirkanmaa (Finland), North-East of England (United 
Kingdom), and Languedoc-Roussillon (France). Interviewees were mainly chosen on 
the basis of their representativeness of the political parties active in the regions, even 
though representatives of labour and entrepreneurial organisations, civic officers and 
other local stakeholders (community organisations members, school and university 
staff) were also interviewed (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1.Interviewees’ socio-geographical categories 
 
Interviewees North East Lombardia Pirkanmaa 
Languedoc-
Roussillon Total 
Politicians 17 8 14 10 49 
Labour representatives 2 3 2 2 9 
Entrepreneur representatives 2 3 2 4 11 
Civic officers 5 2 5 5 17 
Others 4 2 3 4 13 
Total 30 18 26 25 99 
 
 
Men (seventy-one) largely outnumbered women (twenty-eight). Age varied widely, 
with the median value set somewhere around the low fifties. Level of education was 
also rather different, with a large number of respondents holding a university degree 
and a few interviewees also lacking a high-school degree. Information about income 
was not deliberately collected, yet personal details gathered during the interviews al-
low to affirm that the majority of the interviewees belonged to the middle-class, with 
few cases in the upper or lower classes. Interviews, which on average lasted about one 
hour, were conducted in the respondent’s native language (except in Finland, where 
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English was used) and in a place chosen by them (often the working place).1 The 
questions relevant to the present study referred to people’s attitudes towards foreign 
migrants and their preference for multicultural or assimilationist approaches. Inter-
views were digitally recorded, transcribed, and coded by following an ‘analytic induc-
tion’ approach (Crang 1997), which, echoing the grounded theory method, relies on 
the iterative process of going back and forth between original data and theoretical 
concepts in order to reach successively more abstract categorisations (Bryant and 
Charmaz 2007). 
The choice of the four regional case studies was made on the basis of some pre-
liminary statistical findings on Standard Eurobarometer and Eurostat data.2 The four 
regions capture a great variety of Western Europe’s different socio-economic condi-
tions. Lombardia is one of the richest regions in Europe and a major ‘engine’ of the 
European economy, followed by Pirkanmaa, whose regional capital, Tampere, has 
long been on the forefront of the knowledge economy and information society (Cas-
tells and Himanen 2002). Down the ladder, the North-East of England is a region still 
heavily affected by the closure of the coal mining sector, with a relatively high level 
of unemployment, high numbers of people living on benefits and low level of educa-
tion. Similarly, Languedoc-Roussillon is one of the poorest regions of France, with an 
economy essentially based on services for the domestic market and therefore rather 
impermeable to the effects of global economic competition (Giband 2005). In political 
terms, Lombardia is a region traditionally conservative, contrary to the North East of 
England, which has long been a stronghold of the Labour Party. A unique coalition of 
right and left parties (‘brothers in arms’) characterises Pirkanmaa’s regional capital 
(Tampere), while in the Languedoc-Roussillon the long-lasting tradition of the Midi 
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Rouge (Genieys 1998) has recently given way to more centrist and rightist (National 
Front) parties. 
Regarding the ethno-cultural ‘diversity’ of their population, the North-East of 
England and Languedoc-Roussillon belong to traditional countries of immigration, 
whereas the other two regions belong to countries which only in the last decade (Italy) 
or only in the last few years (Finland) have started receiving foreign immigrants, be-
ing previously countries of emigration themselves. This different past is somewhat 
reflected in the percentages of foreign citizens living in these countries (France: 5.8 
per cent; the United Kingdom: 5.4 per cent; Italy: 4.6 per cent; and Finland: 2.2 per 
cent), whereas the same does not hold true at the regional level. In fact, both the North 
East of England (2.2 per cent) and Pirkanmaa (1.7 per cent) are regions with a low 
presence of foreign citizens, when compared with Lombardia (7.1 per cent) and 
Languedoc-Roussillon (5.7 per cent).3 These figures, however, do not take into con-
sideration the presence of citizens of foreign origin and their children (i.e., second and 
third generation ‘immigrants’), who are a significant component of the populations of 
France and the United Kingdom, whereas they are only about to emerge in Italy and 
in Finland. It is within this context that the opinions of the respondents should be lo-
cated. 
 
 
4.The demand of assimilation among white ethnic majority people 
Contrary to the main tenet of the new assimilation theory, an overwhelming majority 
of interviewees, in all the four regional case studies, talked of assimilation in terms of 
a one-way process: ‘they’ have to assimilate into ‘our’ culture, values, ways of doing 
things, etc. While the specifics of this demand of assimilation will be analysed later in 
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this section, here I would like to discuss a few other general points which emerged 
from the interviews. 
The very few who acknowledged that assimilation and integration could also be 
a two-way process were located mainly in Finland, a country highly homogeneous 
both culturally and ethnically, where foreign immigration is a recent phenomenon. 
This might explain why Finnish interviewees were relatively more willing to welcome 
diversity – even though in its ‘tamed’ folkloristic and exotic aspects.  
Across the case studies, it was generally a left-wing political view to character-
ise those who acknowledged assimilation as a mutual process – a point also confirmed 
by quantitative studies (Citrin and Sides 2008; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2009; 
Kessler and Freeman 2005). Within this perspective, the preservation of migrants’ 
identity, traditions, and ‘ways of doing’ was accepted, even though at times this ac-
ceptance sounded more like tolerance or indifference rather than recognition, which 
scholars regard as an essential component in the construction of a viable multicultural 
society (Taylor et al. 1994). Consider, for instance, the following remark by an Eng-
lish male local councillor of an independent political group: 
 
The guy that runs a shop [in my village] is Algerian, but he is accepted to me, he 
does his own things, he does not bother me, he does not bother anybody, he is 
accepted, there is no question. 
 
 
In this perspective, any notion of mutual accommodation is absent and ac-
ceptance is ‘granted’ as long as the migrant ‘does his own things’, thus reproducing 
the highly debated notion of ‘parallel lives’ put forward by the Cantle Report (Home 
Office, 2001). 
Assimilation was also perceived by many interviewees as a natural, inevitable 
phenomenon, which occurs in time without any ad hoc state intervention. This view, 
 13 
which echoes the assimilationist theories of late nineteenth century USA (Kivisto 
2005: 6), was articulated in relation to three major factors: employment, schooling, 
and housing. In other words, to have a job and a house and to send the children to 
school was deemed enough by many interviewees to assimilate the newcomers. Not 
surprisingly, this position was echoed in particular by French interviewees, as it re-
flects indeed the traditional French ‘republican’ model of migrants’ assimilation (Ber-
tossi 2007). This view does not only stress the importance of material factors in fur-
thering assimilation - a point on which scholars also agree (Alba and Nee 1997: 835, 
847) – but it also suggests that assimilation might take place through the mere hap-
pening of everyday life activities in working spaces, schools, sport clubs, shopping 
areas, etc. Quite a few interviewees in France, and a few also in the UK and Italy, 
across the political spectrum, supported this argument, by referring to what they saw 
as examples of successful integration of past domestic migrants (e.g., southern Italians 
moving to Northern Italy) and foreign migrants (e.g. Portuguese, Spanish and Polish 
migrants in France; Irish migrants in the UK). The following comments, respectively 
by a French male trade-unionist and an Italian male representative of an industrial as-
sociation, exemplify this view:  
 
We’ve got lots of Spanish communists and anarchists [who fled Franco’s re-
gime]…who were foreigners thirty years ago. Why did they integrate? Because 
there were jobs, lots of jobs […]. Social ties come whenever there are jobs, 
when people manage to find an accommodation, a flat, where they can stay with 
their families […]. 
 
I remember in the 1950s, when hundreds of [Italian] southerners were arriving 
to the train station… yes, they were still Italians, but at the time the terrone [de-
rogative term for sourthern Italians] was really perceived as an alien in places 
like Como. 
And then what happened?  
Well, nobody think of it anymore. They integrated and they are perceived as 
normal Comaschi [people from Como]. At that time there was a big industrial 
push… but I still remember local people in the bars complaining about terroni 
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who shout too much, who are dirty… the same narrow mentality which applies 
today against the extra-communitari [migrants from outside the EU]. 
 
This view appeared quite comforting to the interviewees, since it foresees assim-
ilation in terms of a one-way, ‘natural’ process, which does not require any effort 
from the receiving society. Yet, it is a view which is obviously blind to both the mu-
tated context within which recent migration has taken place and the more ‘diverse’ 
character of these migrants and their demands. The emergence of a post-Fordist mod-
el of production has indeed endangered the stability of the labour market, by increas-
ing job competition particularly at its lower ends (Anderson et al. 2006; Commander 
et al. 2006), therefore hampering the ‘republican’ model of integration. Migrants have 
also become more ‘diverse’, not only because of the increased number of their coun-
tries of origin (Vertovec 2007), but also in relation to their ‘culture’, which, in certain 
cases, has found itself increasingly out of place in a time of ‘war on terror’ (Kibria 
2008). 
 
The specifics of the assimilation demand 
 
What, however, did the interviewees specifically demand migrants to do in order to 
accept them? The emphasis on ‘doing assimilation’ is not artificially imposed, but it 
actually emerge from the accounts of the interviewees. It reveals the importance of 
assimilation as a process, rather than a condition, as also suggested by Brubaker 
(2001: 534). It is through performance that assimilation becomes something visible in 
the everyday life, something which constructs the image of the newcomer and allows 
for the emergence of individual accounts of rejection or acceptance (Bell, 1999). Yet, 
contrary to Brubaker’s notion of intransitive assimilation, the accounts of the inter-
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viewees reveal very little agency on the part of migrants. Performing assimilation in 
this context means to act, behave and, at times, also think and feel according to the 
demand of the dominant group, with hardly any space of negotiation. 
In what follows, I have deliberately privileged a thematic rather than a geo-
graphic analysis, in order to highlight those opinions which recurred across a variety 
of geographic contexts rather than stressing the specifics of each context. This choice 
aims to avoid redundancy of information and facilitate a general understanding of the 
assimilation’s demand. The analysis points to a commonality of views transversal 
across the geographic case studies and, at times, also across political ideologies. To be 
true, the comments of the interviewees reproduced positions already heard in public 
discourses. Yet, their systematic analysis allows, on the one hand, to emphasise the 
importance of ‘performing’ assimilation and, on the other hand, confirms that assimi-
lation is not a binary condition (assimilated/not-assimilated), but a process which in-
volves various dimensions and can therefore be open to political debate and contesta-
tion. Without pretending to be exhaustive, I believe that the following eight ‘per-
formative dimensions’ are mostly relevant: knowing, participating, accepting, respect-
ing, appreciating, behaving, and feeling. These dimensions, although only loosely, 
signal an increasing erasure of diversity and are indirectly revealing of the type of 
mainstream society into which immigrants assimilate. 
By ‘knowing’ interviewees meant that immigrants should know the culture, the 
history, and the language of the receiving country, as well as its ‘system’, i.e. ‘how 
things work here’. This demand of acculturation does not per se imply the erasure of 
migrants’ culture of origin. To learn the language of the new country, for instance, 
does not obviously prevent retaining one’s native language (Bauböck 1996a: 13). Yet, 
knowing this language empowers the newcomer in the social, political, and economic 
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sphere (Nagel and Staeheli 2005: 488), as for instance observed by a Finnish inter-
viewee, a female local representative of a leftist party:  
 
I don’t understand that assimilation is the same thing [as] becom[ing] Finn. I 
think it is like… knowing Finnish culture so good that [one] can work, can par-
ticipate here. 
Please tell me more about it  
My children... we live in that kind of area… where there a lot of foreign people 
and almost all my children’s friends they come from different countries. They 
[keep] their own culture and their own families, but they speak Finnish and they 
play with my children. I think it is not complicated at all, but when I try to speak 
with the children’s parents is quite impossible – they cannot speak Finnish, usu-
ally even English, they are afraid to go to society, or go to bank… they are some 
kind… they can’t manage here to ordinary life. 
 
As this quote reveals, language is an essential element for ‘participating’, which 
can be regarded as an important component in itself to facilitate the acceptance of the 
newcomers. Two dimensions were often heard: community involvement and econom-
ic participation. The former refers to mundane acts of caring for, talking to, and so-
cialise with your neighbour, as well as to support the local community. Not surpris-
ingly, given public complaints about socio-spatial segregation in the UK (Home 2001; 
Phillips 2005), participation in the everyday life activities of the local community was 
mentioned particularly by English interviewees.  
Economic participation refers to the contribution that migrants bring to the re-
ceiving society in terms of their labour – an essential factor in any process of assimi-
lation (Alba and Nee 1997: 835). Italian and Finnish interviewees in particular 
stressed migrants’ economic contribution, since both in Lombardia (Mainardi 1998) 
and in Finland (Klinge 1990) ‘working hard’ plays a key role in shaping people’s self-
image. The following two quotes, respectively from an Italian female trade unionist 
and a Finnish male representative of a centrist party, substantiate this point: 
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There are some [local] construction workers who after working everyday with 
Maghrebian workers say [in local dialect] ‘well, he is good fellow, he does not 
understand anything, it’s very hard to communicate, but he is good fellow, he 
works hard’. 
 
I think work has taken a big role in our society, maybe too big, because we don’t 
have [much] time for families […]. But work is still gonna be the measure, how 
people are measuring the people who are coming here: are they working or not? 
[striking his fist on the desk] 
 
Often perceived as a distinctive trait of both northern Italians and Finns, work-
ing ethic becomes the medium through which to include or exclude newcomers. Yet, 
as the following quote by an Italian male representative of an entrepreneurial organi-
sation suggests, it is a form of assimilation which obviously has its limits: 
 
[The presence of migrants] is perceived as also something which can be conven-
ient. [There are] jobs which Italian workers don’t want to do anymore, in the 
factories... We take what we need and for the rest we are rather indifferent. 
There is neither excessive fear, nor awareness that this can be transformed into a 
resource. We don’t transform it into something really positive. [It is] only some-
thing we have become used to live with, in a rather opportunistic way: we use it, 
if we need it; otherwise, we just ignore it.  
 
Not only, in case of an economic downturn, would this mode of assimilation not 
work anymore, since newcomers would be increasingly regarded as either scabs or 
scapegoats, as mentioned above. Yet, it is also a mode which remains blind to the cul-
tural difference of the newcomer, thus negating any recognition of her/his own social 
identity and therefore preventing full acceptance – as studies on the civic unrest both 
in the French banlieues (Cesari 2005) and in the northern English towns (Pilkington 
2008) suggest. 
‘Accepting’, ‘respecting’, and ‘appreciating’ our laws, culture, values, social 
rules, and way of life were terms equally heard across the four case studies, particular-
ly among politically centre-rightist interviewees. Both the actual performance (i.e., the 
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act which is demanded to them: accepting, respecting, and appreciating) and the im-
material objects towards which this act is directed (laws, values, etc.) suggest a de-
mand of increasing sameness. To accept and respect the law is indeed part and parcel 
of any civic covenant which organises a territory and as such it demands cultural 
sameness only partially. Yet, to respect and accept the culture, values, social rules and 
way of life of a territory clearly speaks of an uneven power dynamic, marking that 
territory as the space of a given, dominant people who finally controls the accession 
to it. Similarly, moving from ‘accepting’ to ‘respecting’ and ‘appreciating’, the assim-
ilative performance requested to the migrant is of a different nature. For instance, ‘ap-
preciating’ implies acknowledging the positive features of the receiving country and 
might easily transform, as it happened in a couple of interviews with right-wing re-
spondents, into a comparative discourse where our values are better than theirs. With-
in this context, no claims for alternative cultures or criticism towards the receiving 
society are possible, but only conformity. 
Assimilation qua conformity to mainstream society emerged even more clearly 
in relation to the expected behaviour of the newcomers. ‘Behaving’ is indeed the most 
visible performative act and, therefore, it can easily expose the newcomer to possible 
discrimination/exclusion by the dominant group. The (erasure of the) visibility of mi-
grants’ diversity, as expressed in general behaviour, dressing, eating, living, leisure 
activities, and even thinking, was indeed a central issue in various interviews. ‘When 
in Rome do as the Romans do’ was a phrase which, although heard only from one 
English interviewee, captures the general attitude of many respondents across the four 
case studies, who did not always belong to conservative parties. The relevance of a 
conforming behaviour, however banal this might be, can be illustrated by the follow-
ing quote from an English male conservative politician:  
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I am teaching English literature to the children of an Iranian family, but they are 
completely at home in England. The mother, like any mother, makes me a cup 
of coffee. They are Muslims, but you know… 
 
Performing banal acts which conform to and reproduce dominant social norms 
help reducing socio-cultural distance, while facilitating acceptance. The opposite is 
obviously true for behaviours which, instead, appear visibly ‘out of place’ (Creswell 
1996), like, for instance, wearing traditional clothes in public spaces, as noted, with a 
midst of bewilderment and irritation, by a French male socialist city councillor: 
 
I am in charge of a neighbourhood where at five o’clock, at the end of the pray-
er… it’s disturbing! 
What? 
To see so many people wearing their traditional Maghrebian dress… 
 
Diversity should not be shown in public, as its visibility educes an implicit claim 
of recognition, which challenges socio-cultural conformity, homogeneity, and, in the 
case of France, also its ‘republican’ ideology. Diversity must instead be confined 
within the private sphere, as, for instance, remarked by the same previously quoted 
English interviewee: 
 
When I worked in Ukraine people asked me ‘what about Ukrainian communities 
in England?’ I can’t tell you, because I have never heard about it and that’s the 
way it should be. They probably have their Ukrainian clubs, you know, where 
they have their own traditions, but you don’t hear of them; they live like most all 
other people. 
 
Other interviewees agreed on this public/private divide. The only diversity 
which was acceptable in public was one defused of its political charge, treated in folk-
loristic or exotic terms, which often referred to food (international cuisine, kebab res-
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taurants, etc.). Only a few, left-wing interviewees accepted the public manifestation of 
diverse cultural aspects, including religious practices. 
Along with dressing, another major aspect of the behaviour of migrants lament-
ed particularly by French and English interviewees was the habit of living separately 
from the rest of society. Very few interviewees acknowledged that this socio-spatial 
segregation could be a defensive reaction against discrimination and racism, as schol-
ars have shown (Amin 2006; Ehrkamp 2005; Veronis 2007). The majority, across the 
political spectrum and, significantly, also a few people who affirmed to be in the past 
‘strongly committed to multiculturalism’, condemned the ‘living on their own’ of mi-
grants. Physical concentration clearly made many interviewees feel unease, as it actu-
ally conveyed the image of migrants as a distinct ‘out-group’, which might threaten 
the socio-symbolic dominance of the ‘in-group’ (Citrin and Sides 2008). Particularly 
in France, the demands for breaking socio-spatial segregation clearly reproduced the 
French tradition of dealing with ethno-cultural diversity only in spatial terms (Bertossi 
2007: 38), as if the aménagement du territoire (regional and urban planning) would 
automatically solve issues of social discrimination, racism, and inequality. The fol-
lowing quote, by a French male representative of a centre-right party, illustrates this 
point: 
 
If you concentrate some people, as we did in the 1970s, in schools where there 
are 80per cent of immigrants, how can you think that we can have assimilation? 
It’s impossible. We need to distribute them on the territory. We should kind 
of… this people, who did not assimilate… we should find the way to have them 
assimilate in a more open way, make them feel not rejected and therefore we 
should not have a concentration. The more concentration the more rejection, it’s 
automatic. 
 
Yet, ethnically mixed neighbourhoods do not lead per se to higher levels of so-
cial trust, as Putnam (2007) has shown for the case of the US and as one Finnish in-
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terviewee also acknowledged, reflecting on Finland’s housing policy aimed at active-
ly contrasting spatial segregation. 
Finally, a very few interviewees, mainly sharing far-right political ideas, also 
talked of the need for migrants to fully identify with the new country. The newcomers 
must ‘feel’ French, Finnish, etc. This opinion, heard particularly in France, implicitly 
challenges the ‘republican’ model of assimilation. To be a French citizen is not 
enough to be considered French, in the absence of a clearly manifested feeling of 
identification, belonging, attachment and loyalty to the new homeland. As observed 
by a French male rightist interviewee, who consciously echoed an old-assimilationist 
American motto, ‘La France: aimez-la ou quittez-la’ (France: love it or leave it). In-
terviewees sharing this perspective also refused the possibility of double citizenship 
and identity. People have to choose. No transnational ties are admitted. Plus, antici-
pating what today has been formalised and institutionalised as the notion of ‘earned 
citizenship’ (Dorsey and Díaz-Barriga 2007; Andreouli and Stockdale 2009), a couple 
of French interviewees demanded migrants to actively show their love for the country 
and ‘earn’ their new citizenship status through mundane (e.g. working) or illustrious 
(e.g., sport achievements) acts which could contribute to the material/intellectual ad-
vancement of their new homeland. 
 
 
5.Conclusion 
One of the main tenets of the new assimilation theory is that assimilation is not a one-
way, but a two-way process, which involves change in both migrants and the receiv-
ing society. However, scholars have often privileged the study of only one of these 
two sides, analysing the different stages (economic, educational, social, and cultural) 
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through which migrants are incorporated into the receiving society. Relatively few 
studies (apart from quantitative investigations into the socio-demographic factors 
which determine assimilationist attitudes) have analysed the demand of assimilation 
from the perspective of the ethnic majority group. What this people mean by the term 
assimilation has generally been overlooked. 
As a way to fill this gap, the present article has examined local elites’ opinions 
in four Western European regions. The findings reveal that, when analysed from the 
perspective of the members of the dominant ethnic group, assimilation cannot be 
treated as a singular, undifferentiated concept. Assimilation is instead associated with 
a plurality of performative dimensions. Through visible deeds, migrants must con-
stantly show that they have met the various assimilationist demands advanced by the 
ethnic majority group. This also means that, from the perspective of this latter group, 
assimilation hardly mean mutual accommodation and change. In other words, assimi-
lation is largely perceived as a one-way process. 
In the absence of public opinion survey data on how assimilation is perceived by 
ethnic majority groups is difficult to comment on the extent to which the opinions of 
the local elites in this study reflect the opinions of the public at large. Yet, I should 
also say that, as a qualitative study, the present article aimed more at capturing variety 
of opinions across a geographically and socio-demographically diversified sample 
rather than searching for representativeness (Crang 1997). Clearly, some of the opin-
ions expressed could be referred to certain categories of people rather than others, but 
in the absence of a quantitative analysis it would not be advisable to reach such a con-
clusion. Similar considerations apply to the geographic determinants. In this case, 
though, my hypothesis is that place-specific factors might have influenced the ways in 
which some opinions were framed, rather than actually determine them. 
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With these limitations in mind, it is however useful to reflect on the extent to 
which the findings of this study might help refining a scholarly understanding of the 
assimilation process. There are a series of considerations which can be made. First, 
from a methodological perspective, given the plurality of meanings associated with 
the term assimilation, it becomes essential that studies on public attitudes detail which 
aspect of assimilation they aim to assess rather than treating assimilation as an undif-
ferentiated and self-explanatory concept. Second, when analysed from the views of 
ethnic majority people, assimilation hardly stands for a status which can be finally 
acquired through a successful insertion into all the stages outlined by the (new) assim-
ilation theory. On the contrary, assimilation resembles an unstable condition, which 
requires on the part of the migrant an incessant performance across a variety of do-
mains - migrants must constantly show through performative acts that they have as-
similated. This performance is demanded daily by ethnic majority group’s members, 
who perceive themselves as embodying the final authority that can ‘grant’ (but also 
postpone indefinitely) the status of ‘assimilated’. In this sense, economic assimilation, 
educational assimilation and cultural assimilation cannot be regarded as objective 
stages of a linear or bumpy process, since they are imbued with an uneven power dy-
namic which marks them as provisional, constantly dependent on the subjective 
judgement of ethnic majority group’s members. This somewhat challenges the em-
phasis put by the new assimilation theory on migrants’ agency and calls for studies 
which could analyse further the assimilation’s uneven power dynamic and contextual-
ise it in relation to the specific assimilationist demands put forward by a given socie-
ty. Finally, and related to this point, the fact that an overwhelmingly majority of inter-
viewees understood assimilation as a one way process should invite proponents of the 
new assimilation theory to look more carefully into their claim about mutual change. 
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This claim risks indeed being rather prescriptive in the absence of empirical studies 
which can detail when, how, and under which circumstances a reciprocal change takes 
place. 
Recently, Nagel (2009) has proposed to look at assimilation not in terms of ob-
servable patterns of similarity or dissimilarity, but as the discursive and material con-
struction of ‘the mainstream’. I believe that, within this perspective, the notion of as-
similation avoids being trapped into some prescriptive form, but it remains open to the 
power dynamics involved in the assimilation process. Thus, in the present study, 
while demands of ‘knowing’, ‘participating’ and ‘accepting’ point to a mainstream 
which can potentially accommodate diversity, demands of ‘appreciating’, ‘behaving’, 
and ‘feeling’ produce a mainstream which is more likely to exclude, marginalize, hide 
or erase diversity. Different assimilation demands implicate and are implicated in a 
different construction of ‘the mainstream’ and it is important to study them as a way 
to enrich our understanding of the multiple dynamics and (provisional) outcomes as-
sociated with the assimilation process. 
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2 The selection was based on cross-tabulating the results of a cluster analysis (using the significant pre-
dictors from a binary logistic model on European attachment – Eb 60.1, 2003) and Eurostat data (2001-
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2003) about regional GDP per capita (in Purchasing Power Parity values) for each region in the EU-15. 
Further information on the sampling process is available from the author upon request. 
3 Data source: INSEE (France), National Statistics (United Kingdom), ISTAT (Italy), and Ti-
lastokeskus (Finland). Figures relate to the year 2005 (when the field work for the present research was 
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